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ABSTRACT
DTLS is a standardized security protocol designed to provide end-
to-end secure communication among two peers, and particularly
considered for the emerging Internet of Things. In order to protect
group communication, the IETF is currently working on a method
to secure multicast messages through the same DTLS security ser-
vices. However, such an approach relies on traditional DTLS ses-
sions to protect unicast responses to multicast messages. This in-
creases the amount of security material stored by group members
and can have a relevant impact on network performance. In this
paper we propose an extension to the IETF approach which allows
to efficiently protect group responses by reusing the same group
key material. Our proposal does not require to establish additional
DTLS sessions, thus preserving high communication performance
within the group and limiting storage overhead on group members.
Furthermore, we discuss a suitable key management policy to pro-
vision and renew group key material.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and protection
General Terms
SECURITY
Keywords
Security, DTLS, Multicast, Group communication
1. INTRODUCTION
The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [7] has
been introduced by the IETF to provide secure communication be-
tween two peers, in the presence of unreliable datagram protocols
such as UDP [10]. Although it has been standardized only recently,
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DTLS is already asserting itself as the de-facto security protocol
to protect end-to-end communication in the emerging Internet of
Things (IoT) [14][15][20]. DTLS has been designed to be as much
similar as possible to the widely adopted TLS protocol [18], and
provides equivalent security services, i.e. it allows client and server
applications to communicate with one another preventing eaves-
dropping, tampering, and message forgery. In order to establish a
DTLS session, two peers perform a preliminary message exchange
known as handshake, so agreeing on a ciphersuite and establishing
common security material.
More recently, the lighthweight Constrained Application Proto-
col (CoAP) [22] developed by the IETF working group CoRE [1]
has specifically mandated the adoption of DTLS to provide se-
cure communication in machine-to-machine applications and con-
strained networks. Furthermore, the CoRE working group has also
considered application scenarios relying on group communication,
and is currently defining how to use the CoAP protocol on top of
IP multicast [4]. This is particularly desirable and convenient in
the presence of Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), which are
typically composed of low-power and resource constrained devices
featuring scarce computing power and limited battery life.
Of course, such application scenarios may also require the presence
of reliable and efficient security services, in order to assure secure
multicast communication within a group. This is the reason why
another IETF working group, namely DICE [2], is currently defin-
ing how to adapt the DTLS protocol to protect multicast messages
sent by a sender node and received by multiple listener nodes in the
same group [17]. Such an approach has the main goal of protecting
multicast group communication through the usual DTLS security
services. In addition, it relies on a single set of group key material
shared among all group members, and does not require to perform
the complex and costly DTLS handshake in order to establish a
multicast secure session.
The approach described in [17] considers also the protection of
group responses sent by listener nodes as unicast replies to mul-
ticast messages. That is, group responses are supposed to be pro-
tected through distinct unicast DTLS sessions, established between
sender nodes and replying listener nodes in the group. This may
require to perform a significant number of DTLS handshakes, and
may be not reasonable in case unicast secure communication is re-
quired only to protect group responses. Also, such an approach is
likely to be inefficient and even not feasible, especially in the pres-
ence of low-power constrained devices, due to the complex DTLS
handshake execution, and the resulting computing and communica-
tion overhead. Finally, group members would be required to store a
considerable amount of supplementary security material in order to
maintain additional, possibly unnecessary, unicast DTLS sessions.
In this paper, we propose an extension to the DTLS-based multi-
cast communication method under development by the IETF, and
describe how to efficiently protect group responses according to
the same group communication scheme and by reusing the same
group key material. By doing so, it is not necessary to establish
any unicast DTLS session, hence avoiding to perform additional
and costly DTLS handshakes, and preserving high communication
performance within the group. In addition, our extension does not
require group members to store and maintain any additional secu-
rity material, thus not affecting them in terms of storage overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the first contri-
bution aimed at improving efficiency of group response protection
in DTLS-based group communication. Also, our approach does
not break current standards, and thus is suitable for a possible inte-
gration in the current multicast scheme proposed by the IETF. As a
further contribution, the paper describes a suitable key management
policy to address provisioning and renewal of group key material,
in the presence of DTLS-based multicast communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
overviews the main features of DTLS, while Section 3 describes
the DTLS-based multicast communication method proposed by the
IETF. In Section 4, we present our extension for reusing group key
material to protect group responses. Section 5 discusses a key man-
agement policy suitable to the considered communication scenario.
Finally, in Section 6 we draw our conclusive remarks.
2. DTLS OVERVIEW
The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [7] has
been designed to provide secure communication for applications
based on unreliable datagram protocols, such as UDP [10]. DTLS
is based on the TLS protocol [18], and provides equivalent security
services, i.e. it allows client and server applications to commu-
nicate with one another preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and
message forgery. In order to address the unreliable nature of data-
gram transport protocols, DTLS introduces a few minor changes
with respect to TLS, such as making distinct messages indepen-
dent from one another, and not forcing to terminate active sessions
upon receiving invalid messages. Also, DTLS provides an optional
stateless Cookie mechanism, in order to counteract possible Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks against DTLS servers.
Figure 1: DTLS record header.
Messages are transmitted as a sequence of DTLS records, each one
of which includes the header shown in Figure 1. The Type and
Version fields indicate the referred higher level protocol and the
adopted version of DTLS, respectively, while the Length field rep-
resents the size in bytes of the actual application data conveyed
in the record. Finally, with respect to TLS, two additional fields
have been included, namely Epoch and Sequence Number. Specif-
ically, the Epoch value is incremented upon changing the currently
used security protocols and material, while the Sequence Number
value is incremented for every new message transmitted by the
same peer over the same DTLS session. The concatenation of the
Epoch and Sequence Number fields is considered as a 64 bit fresh
value, namely explicit nonce, and is used to compute a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) to provide integrity of DTLS records.
For each secure session established, a DTLS peer maintains a write
connection state and a read connection state. Practically, write
(read) connection states are operating environments referred while
processing outgoing (incoming) messages within a DTLS session.
Among other information, connection states define a given DTLS
peer as either client or server, and include current Epoch and Se-
quence Number values, as well as algorithms and security material
used throughout the session.
A DTLS client and server establish a secure session through a spe-
cific handshake process. This is necessary in order to agree on a
common set of security algorithms and derive the security material
used to protect DTLS records. In particular, DTLS client and server
generate and exchange two random values, i.e. client random and
server random, and come to agree on a premaster secret. The lat-
ter is in turn composed of a 46 bytes random field, whose value
is generated at random, and a 2 bytes client version field. Then,
the premaster secret is used together with client random and server
random by the two peers, in order to derive the actual security ma-
terial for the DTLS session.
However, performing a DTLS handhshake is a complex, time con-
suming, and resource demanding process. In fact, it results in at
least two message round trips, requires to perform a number of
cryptographic operations, and assumes that DTLS client and server
have been already provided with some preliminary security ma-
terial. In particular, two main approaches to provide preinstalled
cryptographic keys are admitted. The first one is based on asym-
metric key pairs, while the second one relies on symmetric keys
pre-shared between client and server and avoids sending/receiving
public certificates and performing costly public key operations.
3. DTLS-BASED MULTICAST SECURITY
The IETF is currently working on readapting DTLS to secure group
communication, with particular reference to Low-Power and Lossy
Networks (LLNs) and the lightweight application protocol CoAP
[4][22]. Specifically, the IETF working group DICE [2] is defin-
ing how to adapt the usual DTLS record security services in order
to protect multicast messages sent by a sender node and received
by multiple listener nodes in the same group [17]. This section
summarizes the main aspects of such a proposal.
In the following, we consider a multicast group G associated to a
unique IP address IPG, which has been previously allocated for
IP multicast communication. All group members trust one another,
and are not supposed to tamper with multicast messages sent within
the group. In particular, members of group G can belong to two
possible categories, namely senders and listeners, and can have
both roles depending on their actual network activity in the group.
Sender nodes are responsible for transmitting multicast messages to
group G, while listener nodes are explicitly interested in receiving
multicast messages. In principle, any node can become a listener,
by registering with a network routing device, and signaling its in-
tent to receive messages sent to the IPG address. Instead, senders
nodes are not supposed to be aware of the group membership or get
notified of new listener nodes.
Also, members of group G maintain separate group connection
states CSW and CSR, referred while processing outgoing or in-
coming multicast messages within the group, respectively. In par-
ticular, group connection states are configured in such a way that
sender nodes act as servers, while listener nodes act as clients. Ev-
ery sender node in the group initializes to 0 the Sequence Number
value in its own write group connection stateCSW , and increments
it for every multicast DTLS record sent to group G.
Finally, an additional entity named Group Controller (GC) is re-
sponsible for creating the group, managing the actual join process
to add new group members, and providing them with the commonly
shared group security material. The GC is not required to be also
an actual sender within the group, and can be discovered by joining
nodes through various methods, such as DNS-SD [16] and Resource
Directory [21].
Figure 2: Group communication scenario: (a) single multicast
message; (b) multiple unicast responses.
Figure 2 shows a group G composed of one sender node s and
three listener nodes r1, r2, and r3. Group messages are sent by
the sender node s as a single multicast transmission (Figure 2:a),
while possible responses by individual listener nodes are sent back
as unicast messages (Figure 2:b). This is consistent with the CoAP
group communication guidelines provided in [4].
3.1 Protection of multicast messages
As described in [17], a DTLS group session is established without
performing a regular handshake process. Instead, the GC securely
provides all group members with a common Group Security As-
sociation (GSA) [19], including the adopted ciphersuites and a set
of preliminary security parameters. Specifically, all group mem-
bers are provided by the GC with the same GSA, and use it to au-
tonomously derive the same DTLS SecurityParameters structure as
defined in [18]. Besides, the GSA includes also the DTLS premas-
ter secret, the client random value and the server random value,
usually generated while performing a DTLS handshake. Then, ev-
ery group member relies on such three pieces of information in
order to derive the actual group key material reported below. Note
that, as an alternative, the GC may include the six key material
elements directly in the GSA, upon providing it to group members.
client write MAC key
server write MAC key
client write encryption key
server write encryption key
client write IV
server write IV
Such group key material is thus associated to the GSA, and secretly
shared between all group members. Then, sender nodes can use
it to protect multicast messages by means of usual DTLS security
services. Specifically, before transmitting a multicast message M ,
a sender node protects it by using the group server write parame-
ters. Then, every listener node uses the same server write param-
eters to process message M upon its reception. The exact usage
of the server write parameters depends on the specific ciphersuite
adopted by group members [17]. On the other hand, at the moment
it is not defined any possible usage of the client write parameters,
either by sender nodes, or by listener nodes. Finally, note that,
since all group members share the same group security material, it
is not possible to assure source authenticity of multicast messages
sent within the group.
As mentioned in Section 2, the message authenticity process re-
lies on a 64 bit explicit nonce, i.e the concatenation of the Epoch
field and the Sequence Number field in the DTLS record header.
However, the presence of multiple sender nodes inevitably leads
to reusing the same explicit nonce values, and makes it impossible
to check that received multicast messages are actually fresh. As
a consequence, multicast messages sent by different sender nodes
may be considered as replayed messages by listener nodes, and
get discarded. Furthermore, the commonly adopted ciphersuite
MTS_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 requires that the explicit nonce
value is different for each distinct invocation of the encryption func-
tion using the same key material. Hence, DTLS sequence num-
ber values maintained by multiple sender nodes in their respective
write group connection stateCSW would need to be synchronized,
in order to avoid their reuse.
Since synchronizing sequence number spaces within a group can
definitely be a difficult task, [17] proposes to separate sequence
number spaces of different sender nodes, and then embed a unique
sender identifier in the original Sequence Number field of the DTLS
record header, as suggested in [11]. Then, the GC is required
to additionally assign a unique SenderID to each sender node in
the group, and provide all group members with a list of active
SenderIDs. Also, every listener node maintains a distinct read
group connection state CSRs for every sender node s, identified by
the associated SenderID. Finally, the original DTLS record header
is adapted accordingly, as reported in Figure 3. In particular, the
original 6 octet Sequence Number field in the DTLS record header
has been redefined as a 1 octet SenderID field followed by a 5 octet
Truncated Sequence Number field.
Figure 3: DTLS record header for multicast messages.
Upon receiving a multicast message M , every listener node re-
trieves i) the destination address IPG as well as the destination
port PG; and ii) the sender identifier from the SenderID field of the
DTLS record header. Then, it uses such pieces of information to
retrieve the GSA associated to group G and the read group connec-
tion state CSRs referred to the sender node s. Finally, it retrieves
the group server write parameters, and uses them to process mes-
sage M . The message freshness is verified by checking the Epoch
and Truncated Sequence Number field with the values stored in the
read group connection state CSRs .
Note that listener nodes which lately join the group do not know the
Epoch and Truncated Sequence Number currently used by differ-
ent sender nodes. Hence, when such listener joining nodes receive
a multicast message, they may be not able to verify if it is fresh
and has not been replayed by an adversary. In order to overcome
this issue, [17] suggests to adopt the following approach. Upon
receiving a multicast message M from a given sender node s for
the first time, a late joining listener node initializes the Epoch and
Truncated Sequence Number in its own read group connection state
CSRs associated to the sender node s. However, message M is dis-
carded, i.e. it is not delivered to the application layer. This provides
a reference point to identify if future multicast messages from the
same sender node s are fresher than the last one received.
4. GROUP RESPONSE PROTECTION
As summarized in Section 3, the approach described in [17] ex-
tensively addresses the protection of multicast messages sent by
sender nodes. However, in many application scenarios, listener
nodes are supposed to reply to sender nodes, by sending back in-
dividual response messages. Besides, the latters may need to be
secured as well, in order to assure confidentiality, integrity, authen-
ticity, and replay protection. In fact, if such responses to multicast
messages were not secured at all, an adversary could access their
content as well as tamper with them by forging data and control
information, so performing an attack against the whole group.
The current version of [17] takes this issue into account and pre-
scribes that unicast responses to DTLS-based multicast messages
must be secured. In particular, such unicast responses are supposed
to be protected by means of traditional unicast DTLS sessions, es-
tablished between sender nodes and listener nodes. However, this
may require to perform a significant number of DTLS handshakes
within the group, and may be not convenient in case unicast se-
cure communication is required only to protect group responses. In
this section, we present an extension to the secure communication
scheme described in [17], and propose an approach to efficiently
protect group responses, by relying on the same scheme described
in Section 3 and reusing the same group security material.
4.1 Motivation
The straightforward approach described in [17] and based on tra-
ditional unicast DTLS sessions requires that every sender node in
the group establishes a unicast DTLS session with each replying
listener node. Hence, every sender node is required to perform a
DTLS handshake with all replying listener nodes in the group, i.e.,
in the worst case, with all other group members.
However, this can be not reasonable and convenient, especially if
unicast secure communication within the group is required only
by listener nodes to send group responses to multicast messages.
Moreover, such an approach is likely to be inefficient and even not
feasible, especially in the presence of constrained low-power de-
vices, due to the complexity displayed by the DTLS handshake ex-
ecution, and the resulting computing and communication overhead.
In fact, as a first option, every sender node should establish a uni-
cast DTLS session with each replying listener node before sending
its first multicast message to the group. This would require every
sender node to be aware of the current group membership, i.e. to
know what listener nodes are currently present in the group. Also,
every sender node should establish further unicast DTLS sessions
in case new listener nodes join the group. Hence, this would force
to provide sender nodes with otherwise unnecessary information,
as well as to keep them up to date about possible changes in the
group membership, upon new nodes’ joining. However, [17] ex-
plicitly states that applications on group nodes do not know, and do
not get notified, when new listener nodes join the group.
As a different approach, every listener node should establish a uni-
cast DTLS session with a given sender node in the group before
sending back its own first group response message. However, this
would result in sender nodes possibly flooded with a potentially
consistent number of DTLS handshakes to be performed.
Note that both the approaches described above also introduce a not
negligible delay before the group can become fully operative, due
to the execution of a considerable number of DTLS handshakes.
Moreover, the observed impact on group members’ availability and
performance would be even more severe, in case nodes are allowed
to be members of more than one multicast group at the same time.
4.2 Protection of response messages
In the following, we describe how listener nodes can protect their
individual group responses, by reusing the same group security ma-
terial described in Section 3.1.
Basically, in order to adopt our approach, sender nodes must be
able to recognize whether a received unicast message is actually a
group response sent by a listener node, i.e. a reply to a previously
sent multicast message. Hence, upon creating the group G, the GC
provides group nodes also with a unique 1 byte GroupID associ-
ated to G, namely IDG. After that, possible new nodes must be
provided with the same identifier IDG upon joining the group. So
doing, every group member is able to univocally identify the GSA
associated to G, by means of the associated multicast address IPG
and port PG, as well as by the GroupID IDG.
In addition, every sender node maintains a separate read group con-
nection state CSRr identified by the unicast address IPr , for every
listener node r that has sent at least one group response. Similarly,
every listener node maintains a separate write group connection
state CSWs , for every sender node s in the group, identified by the
unique associated SenderID IDs. Each one of such CSWs includes
a Sequence Number value initialized to 0 and incremented for every
unicast group response sent to sender node s. Finally, we introduce
an additional format for the DTLS record header, whose structure
is depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: DTLS record header for group response messages.
Listener nodes. Upon receiving a multicast message M sent to the
multicast address IPG by a sender node s, a listener node r can
process its group response R as follows. First, it prepares a DTLS
record specifying the actual response data as payload, and referring
to the record header structure depicted in Figure 4. In particular, the
listener node r: i) fills the 5 octet Truncated Sequence Number field
with the sequence number value stored in the write group connec-
tion state CSWs associated to sender node s, before incrementing
it; and ii) fills the 1 octet GroupID field with the group identifier
IDG. Finally, the listener node r protects the group response R
by means of the group client write parameters, before sending it
to the sender node s as a unicast message. Note that, in case a
sender node s and a listener node r have previously established a
traditional unicast DTLS session, the latter can still be used to send
back the response message R in a secure way. Hence, in such a
case, the listener node r is not required to maintain a write group
connection state CSWs associated to the sender node s.
Sender nodes. Upon receiving the group response R, the sender
node s proceeds as follows. Firstly, it checks if any unicast DTLS
session has been previously established with the listener node r,
which is identified by the unicast source address IPr retrieved from
message R. In case of positive match, the response message R is
processed according to the traditional DTLS protocol [7]. Note
that, in such a case, the sender node s does not need to maintain a
read group connection state CSRr associated to the listener node r.
Conversely, in case of negative match, the sender node s does not
yet consider message R to be invalid, and proceeds as follows.
First, the sender node s parses the DTLS record header of mes-
sage R according to the format shown in Figure 4, and retrieves
the value reported in the GroupID field, i.e. IDG. Then, s veri-
fies whether it maintains a GSA associated to the retrieved IDG,
namely GSAG. In case of negative match, the sender node s dis-
cards message R. Otherwise, it processes message R by means of
the group client write parameters associated to GSAG. Then, it
verifies the freshness of message R, by comparing the Epoch and
Truncated Sequence Number field with the values stored in the read
group communication state CSRr associated to the listener node r.
In case the read group communication state CSRr cannot be found,
the sender node s creates it, and initializes Epoch and Truncated
Sequence Number to the same values retrieved from message R.
Note that, in case the response message R has been received by a
group member which is not configured as a sender node, the latter
can simply consider R to be invalid, and discard it.
In principle, it is possible that a sender node belongs to two or
more different multicast groups whose respective GC has assigned
the same GroupID value. However, the sender node is supposed
to communicate within each one of such different groups by means
of distinct applications. In turn, each one of them would refer to a
different port number to handle incoming messages. Hence, upon
receiving a protected group response R, a sender node can still
univocally identify the right GSA, by using the GroupID value re-
trieved from the DTLS header, together with the port number con-
veyed in the transport protocol header.
Finally, in the presence of our approach, the method proposed to
deal with late listener joiners described in Section 3 should be used
also for late sender joiners. In particular, upon receiving a group
response R from a given listener node r for the first time, a late
joining sender node creates and initializes a read group commu-
nication state CSRr as described above. However, message R is
discarded, i.e. it is not delivered to the application layer. This pro-
vides a reference point to identify if future unicast group responses
from the same listener node r are fresher than the last one received.
4.3 Discussion
The main advantage of our approach consists in reusing the same
group security material shared by all group members. This makes
it possible for listener nodes in the group to securely reply to multi-
cast messages without establishing new DTLS sessions. As a con-
sequence, group members are not required to store additional secu-
rity material, thus considerably limiting their storage overhead.
More important, unless unicast secure sessions are specifically re-
quired, group members do not need to perform any DTLS hand-
shake. This particularly benefits sender nodes, which are not re-
quired to establish and maintain a unicast DTLS session with each
replying listener node in the group. As a consequence, the group
can become fully operative with no particular delays, and new join-
ing nodes can instantly participate in multicast group communica-
tion. In addition, a considerable processing overhead is avoided
on group members, and high communication performance is pre-
served within the group. To the best of our knowledge, there are
currently no publicly available implementations of DTLS adapta-
tions for multicast scenarios. As a future work, we will imple-
ment multicast communication support for DTLS, and experimen-
tally evaluate performance in the presence and in the absence of the
extension described in Section 4.2.
Furthermore, our approach requires that only a 1 byte group iden-
tifier is additionally provided to group members, upon joining the
group. Also, it does not require sender nodes to be aware of the
current group membership, i.e. to know what listener nodes are
currently present in the group. Therefore, in dynamic application
scenarios, it is not necessary to provide group members with the
identity of new listener nodes when they join the group. Finally,
the DTLS record header we propose for group responses (see Fig-
ure 4) is only 13 bytes in size, and has the very same structure of
the DTLS record header proposed for multicast messages (see Fig-
ure 3). Hence, our approach is particularly easy to be integrated
with the secure multicast scheme proposed by the IETF [17].
On the other hand, just like the approach presented in [17], our
proposal does not provide data source authentication, since group
responses to multicast messages are protected by means of the com-
monly shared group security material. Also, since all group mem-
bers are potentially able to access and alter such response messages,
confidentiality is assured only against an adversary external to the
group. However, as discussed in [17], both limitations are practi-
cally acceptable in many application scenarios, since members of a
multicast group are reasonably assumed to be trusted, and are not
prone to tamper with messages from other group members. Fur-
thermore, in many LLNs use cases, group members even belong to
a common authority and are configured by a trusted commissioner.
In the presence of applications that inevitably require data source
authentication, or assume that group members are not supposed to
trust one another, application layer solutions such as digital signa-
tures can be explicitly adopted. However, digital signatures are well
known to be quite honerous from a computation standpoint, not to
mention that size of signed messages increases due to the signa-
ture appending [3]. For instance, RSA-1024 requires the presence
of 128 additional bytes per message, so resulting in a considerable
communication overhead. Performance of digital signatures can be
ameliorated by relying on Elliptic Curve Criptography (ECC) [6].
For instance, ECC-160 is roughly an order of magnitude faster than
RSA, and results in 40 additional bytes per message, although pro-
viding the same level of security. Of course, as a final alternative
approach, unicast DTLS sessions can still be adopted to provide
source authenticity by protecting group responses altogether.
5. KEY MANAGEMENT
As stated in [17], DTLS-based multicast communication should
rely on a secure mechanism aimed at distributing keying material,
multicast security policies, and security parameters to the multicast
group. Also, the GC is indicated as primarily responsible for pro-
viding the GSA to group members. However, the actual establish-
ment of a GSA is not addressed in [17], and will be part of a future
IETF activity dedicated to the design of a generic key management
scheme, preferably based on requirements and recommendations
defined in [9][13][19]. In this section, we propose a possible key
management policy to renew the group security material and pro-
vide the current GSA to new group members upon their joining. In
particular, we refer to the IETF multicast scheme described in [17]
and the extension we have presented in Section 4.
We recall that the actual group key material is computed from the
SecurityParameters derived from the GSA, with particular refer-
ence to the premaster secret, the client random value and the server
random value. Hence, group key renewal can be easily performed
by securely providing the group members with a new premaster
secret. After that, the latter can be used to renew the group key ma-
terial, while all other settings and information in the GSA, e.g. the
adopted cryptosuite, can remain unchanged. In the following, we
consider the GC to be an additional member of the multicast group,
and to be configured as a sender node.
Periodical rekeying. Renewing the group key material in a peri-
odical fashion is recommended in order to discourage an external
adversary from performing exhaustive key search or traffic analy-
sis. This assumes that the group has not been compromised, i.e.
a possible adversary has not taken any group member under her
control. The amount of time between two consecutive occurrences
of periodical rekeying should be properly defined considering the
application requirements, and the perceived level of threat in the
group. Of course, the more frequent the periodical rekeying, the
less the damage due to possibly compromised group key material.
In order to perform a periodical rekeying, the GC can broadcast a
new securely generated premaster secret to group members. This
can be done by broadcasting a single DTLS multicast message, pro-
tected by means of the current server write parameters as any other
multicast message transmitted to the group. Once it has been re-
ceived, the new premaster secret value is stored in the GSA by all
group members, and used to renew the current group key material.
Such an approach relies in turn on the commonly shared group key
material, and thus, as discussed in Section 4.3, cannot assure source
authenticity of rekeying messages. That is, group members can-
not be sure that a rekeying message has been actually sent by the
GC. In order to address this issue, values for the random field of
new premaster secrets can be generated by the GC as elements of
a reversed hash chain, an authentication mechanism derived from
Lamport’s one-time password [12]. The advantage of such an ap-
proach is that the most recently released element in the chain can be
efficiently authenticated by computing its hash, and verifying that
the result is equal to the previously released element in the chain.
Therefore, upon creating the multicast group, it is sufficient that the
GC provides all members with the head element of the hash chain
in an authenticated way, e.g. off-line or through a predefined point-
to-point authenticated channel. Then, all other chain elements can
be automatically and efficiently authenticated by group members.
Nodes’ joining. In the presence of a new node joining the group,
the rekeying procedure is required to assure backward security,
whose importance has been explicitly stressed in [13]. Specifically,
the joining node must not be able to access any group communica-
tion which took place before its joining. As a first step, currently
present group members can be rekeyed according to the same peri-
odical rekeying procedure described above. After that, the GC can
provide the updated GSA containing the new premaster secret value
to the joining node, which can then complete the join process.
In particular, the GC should provide the joining node with the GSA
through a secure communication channel. As a possible approach,
upon contacting the Resource Directory service to gain knowledge
of the GC address, the joining node could retrieve a public cer-
tificate associated to the GC, use the retrieved public key K+GC
to establish a secure channel with the GC, and securely obtain the
GSA. As an alternative approach, the joining node can establish a
DTLS session with the GC, and receive the GSA as a sequence of
protected DTLS records.
Nodes’ leaving. A group member can decide to leave the multicast
group, for instance when its mission is concluded or its membership
is expired. Also, it can be forced to leave, in case it has been found
to be compromised or it is suspected so. Then, remaining group
members must be securely provided with updated group key mate-
rial. This is vital in order to assure forward security, whose impor-
tance has been explicitly stressed in [13]. Specifically, the leaving
node must not be able to access group communication which takes
place after its departure from the group. However, the most im-
portant and difficult aspect of such a rekeying process is to prevent
the leaving node from taking part in the rekeying process itself, i.e.
from accessing the new security material during its distribution. In
particular, since the leaving node is aware of the current group key
material, the latter can not be used to securely distribute a new pre-
master secret to the remaining nodes.
Security considerations in [17] state that the GC is assumed to share
a different pairwise symmetric key with every member of the group.
Although more details are not provided, it is reasonable to assume
that such a key is established between the two entities during the
join process. Then, upon a node’s leaving, the GC could rely on
such pairwise keys to distribute a new premaster secret to all re-
maining nodes, in a one to one fashion. However, such a unicast
approach lacks of efficiency, since it requires a number of rekey-
ing messages which linearly grows with the number of nodes in the
group, hence not scaling well with the group size. As an alternative,
it is possible to rely on application level schemes for group rekey-
ing, which result to be more efficient and display high scalability
with the number of nodes in the group [5][8].
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the DTLS-based multicast com-
munication method recently proposed by the IETF. In particular,
we have highlighted that it displays inefficiencies in protecting uni-
cast group responses to multicast messages. Then, we presented an
extension to protect group responses according to the same group
communication scheme and by reusing the same group security ma-
terial. Our proposal does not break current standards, and does not
require to establish additional unicast DTLS sessions among group
members, thus preserving high communication performance within
the group and limiting storage overhead on group members. Fur-
thermore, we have described a suitable key management policy to
perform provisioning and renewal of group key material. Future
work will consist in implementing multicast communication sup-
port for the DTLS protocol, and experimentally evaluating perfor-
mance in the presence and in the absence of our extension.
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